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SECURITIES
During the year covered by this survey the Tenth Circuit
decided eight cases involving the federal securities laws., While
the majority of these cases were dependent on peculiar facts and
did not change established Tenth Circuit law, the court did clarify its position with regard to the treatment of promissory notes
as securities in Barrow v. Ellingson' and Zabriskie v. Lewis,3 and,
in Clegg v. Conk,' it analyzed the requirement of scienter in rule
10b-51 actions. These cases are the subject of the two comments
which follow.
REVIEWING THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IN
CASES IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT

10b-5

Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974)
By

CATHY

S.

KRENDL*, JAMES

I.

R.

KRENDL**

THE CASE

A.

The Facts
The facts of Clegg v. Conk,' presented by a partial record on
appeal, were at best incomplete. The court, for reasons discussed
below, attempted to review issues which were beyond the scope
of the appeal and, therefore, extracted "structural facts" from the
I Barrow v. Ellingson, No. 74-1735 (10th Cir., July 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication); Resort Car Rental Sys. v. Chuck Ruwart Chevrolet, Inc., 519 F.2d 317 (10th Cir.
1975); Pratt v. First Cal. Co., 517 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1975); Crowley v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., No. 74-1476 (10th Cir., May 14, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication); Clegg v. Conk,
507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507
F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974);
Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974).
' No. 74-1735 (10th Cir., July 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
3 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974).
4 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975).
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1967, North
Texas State University; J.D., 1970, Harvard Law School.
** Partner, Seawell, Cohen & Sachs, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1963, Harvard University; J.D., 1970, Harvard Law School.
1 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975).
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fragmentary information available.' The "structural facts"
which emerged are admittedly vague. Apparently, in August 1968
the defendant-appellant Conk was granted a distributorship for
car wash units by Hanna Enterprises, a non-incorporated, out-ofstate business. Conk arranged a meeting or meetings where an
investment proposal was presented to a group of prospective
investors by Conk and his associate, Stewart. At trial it was determined that Conk made untrue statements or omitted to state
facts necessary to render what he said not misleading, and that
these statements and omissions were material to the investment
judgment of the appellees who relied upon them in making investments in appellant's business.
Appellees brought an action against Conk, alleging violations
of section 17a of the Securities Act of 19331 (Securities Act), section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (Exchange Act),
rule 10b-51 promulgated thereunder, and the Utah Uniform
Securities Act.' The claim under the Utah Act was dropped, and
the case was submitted to the jury on the basis of section 10b and
rule 10b-5.8 The jury awarded $5,000 to each plaintiff, and Conk
appealed.
B.

PeculiarProcedural Context

The importance of this case is considerably limited by the
unusual procedural context in which it arose. The issue of
scienter, which was the central question in the appellate court's
view, was not formally or substantially raised at the trial court
level, or even in the respective briefs of the parties. The appellant
did not submit a request to charge on scienter, nor did he take
timely and sufficient exception to any instruction which was relevant to the issue.' At various points during the trial, counsel for
I Id. at 1352. The court noted that formulating the background facts in this case was
not an easy matter. Id. n.1.
I This factual determination was effectively lifted from the appellant's brief. The
appellee's brief suggests that the deception was not so much the result of statements at
these meetings but of manipulation of the capital of the corporation for the personal profit
of Conk and Stewart and to create a false and inflated appearance of actual cash invested
in the corporation. See Brief for Appellees, Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
5 Id. § 78j.
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
' UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-1 to -30 (1953).
The court did not refer to the disposition, if any, of the claim under section 17a.
507 F.2d at 1363.
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appellant apparently urged the court to include an instruction on
scienter, but this suggestion was primarily an argument supporting appellant's contention that plaintiff's claim should be barred
by the shorter statute of limitations of the Securities Act.' After
appellant lost the statute of limitations argument, he did halfheartedly pursue his scienter point, but failed to furnish any
request to charge except for a general statement after the instructions were given that "I would just have a general exception, your
Honor, as I indicated earlier, that I think there should have been
more scienter in the instruction as a whole, and I understand the
Court's position.""
The court, therefore, concluded that, no proper charge nor
timely exception having been taken, the judgment of the trial
court could be reversed only upon a showing of fundamental injustice.2
The court finally determined that, for two reasons, there was
no demonstration of fundamental injustice so as to compel reversal of the trial court. First, the defendant must have acted with
some kind of conscious fault, recklessness, or knowledge other
than mere negligence. Second, the trial court's instruction did
include the language of the rule; and laymen, unlike lawyers,
could "sense" from this language, in context of the other instructions, that some kind of fault beyond mere carelessness must be
established."'
0Id.
I Id.
1

Id. at 1362.

" The instruction from which the jury was to "sense" the requirement of scienter was
as follows:
14. In order for you to find for any of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant Conk upon the federal claim, you must find by a preponderance
of the evidence each of the following enumerated elements:
1. That in connection with or in furtherance of the transaction
involving DeKater Corporation, there was use of some means or instrumentality of interstate commerce . ...
2. That the transaction involved the sale or purchase of a security

3. That in connection with the transaction, or in order to effect
or perpetuate it, the defendant Conk did any one or more of the
following:
a. Engaged in any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
any or all of the plaintiffs, or
b. Made any untrue statements of material fact, or
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C.

Questions Presented
Three questions were dealt with in the case: (1) Does the 1year statute of limitations of section 13 of the Securities Act 4 or
the 3-year general fraud statute of limitations of Utah 5 apply to
implied rights of action under rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act; (2)
to what degree, if any, must the plaintiffs demonstrate reliance
on the misrepresentations or omissions; and (3) to what extent,
if any, must the plaintiffs prove "scienter" on the part of the
defendant with respect to the misrepresentations or omissions?
These questions, although raised to some degree in the trial
court and in the briefs, were actually treated as one question by
the parties: What is the applicable statute of limitations? The
primary focus of the arguments with respect to scienter and reliance was that the necessity to prove either of these elements (or
the lack thereof) required the application of one or the other
statutes of limitations."
It is, therefore, curious to find that the court dismissed the
statute of limitations question in one paragraph and spent the
bulk of its opinion on the question of scienter. It would appear
that the court found the issues raised by the parties to be of
negligible importance, but felt this was an opportune time to
attempt to clarify the Tenth Circuit's position on scienter in 10b5 cases.
c. Omitted to state any material fact necessary in order to
make any statement made, in light of the circumstances in
which they were made, not misleading.
4. That with regard to the misstatement of a material fact, such
misstatement was a substantial factor in the investment decision.
But with regard to the omission of a material fact, as distinguished from a misstatement, it is not necessary to plaintiff's recovery
for you to find that such omission was a substantial factor in plaintiff's
investment decision.
In general instructions the jury was told that "[an undisclosed material fact is a fact which would have influenced a reasonable man to act
differently had he not been informed of the fact", that" 'material' or 'material fact'" as I have used these terms means "of significance to a person in
exercising his investment judgment", and that "[the fact of reliance by a
plaintiff upon particular statements or omissions, if you find such to be the
fact, is persuasive evidence that the particular statement or omission relied
upon is material."
Id. at 1354-55 n.8 (editorial comments by the court omitted).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970).
" UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3) (1953).
IS

507 F.2d at 1363.

SECURITIES

1.

Statute of Limitations

The court summarily disposed of the statute of limitations
question by declaring that the 3-year general fraud statute of
limitations of the state-and not the 1-year statute of limitations
of the Securities Act-governs implied rights of action under the
Exchange Act.
The court gave no reason for its conclusion but pointed out
quite correctly that the Tenth Circuit has, in at least five earlier
cases, 17 applied the state statute and the rule is, therefore, clearly
established in this circuit. It is perhaps unfortunate that the court
did not take the opportunity to elucidate the policy considerations behind this rule by responding to the arguments raised by
the defendant-appellant at trial and in his brief. 8 It is, however,
apparent that the court found none of appellant's arguments sufficiently challenging to encourage it to reconsider the rule on this
subject or even to discuss it. 9
', Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 918 (1972) (in consolidated case Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.); Esplin v.
Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Chiodo v. General
Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d 860 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1004 (1967). See also
deHass v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970). For a discussion of the
applicable statute of limitations in other jurisdictions see 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURmES LAW:
FRAUD § 2.5(2) (1967).
" 507 F.2d at 1353. Substantial trial time was consumed by the statute of limitations
and related issues, which included: (1) Had the question of the statute of limitations been
waived; (2) was motion to dismiss on the ground that the claims were barred timely; (3)
could the statute be considered since it was not pleaded as an affirmative defense; (4) was
the defendant guilty of sharp practice by delaying the pressing of this defense until the
opening of trial; (5) on the assumption that a 2-year state statute was applicable, could
plaintiffs successfully claim that they did not discover the alleged fraud until within 2
years of the commencement of their action when the complaint alleged that they had
discovered the fraud 1 month earlier; and (6) does the statute start running with the
discovery of some of the fraud if the greater part of its seriousness and circumstances are
discovered later.
1 Appellants argued that, since the general fraud statute of limitations of the states
within the Tenth Circuit range from 2 years (Kansas and Oklahoma) to 4 years (New
Mexico and Wyoming), the present rule which applies these statutes encourages forum
shopping and may result in unequal relief to federal claimants who bring like claims in
different jurisdictions. See Brief for Appellants at 29, Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th
Cir. 1974).
It might also be argued that a state general fraud statute should not apply to lOb-5
actions since the Tenth Circuit has stated on many occasions that a lob-5 cause of action
will not be subject to common law fraud standards. See Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc.,
502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965). But
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Reliance

In the trial court, references by counsel to reliance were apparently made only to support their respective arguments relating to the proper statute of limitations. 0 The appellate court,
however, treated reliance and scienter, in a discussion which
often fails to distinguish between the two, as viable issues on
appeal. The court found that the instructions given by the trial
court on reliance met the rule of Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, ' but the court then stated, in what is at least a
superficially paradoxical conclusion, that section 10b requires
"something more by way of reliance or causation in fact than
' 2
some abstract wrong expending its force entirely upon itself 1
and that this rule is compatible with Affiliated Ute.
The question then is whether the holding of Clegg actually
is consistent with Affiliated Ute. To answer this question, the
language of the court in the instant case must be analyzed and
contrasted with its disposition of the case. In an early part of its
decision, the court quoted with apparent agreement this crucial
language from Affiliated Ute.
"Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a
failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to
recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material
in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them
important in the making of this decision . . . This obligation to
disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact." '

Commentators and the courts in most of the circuits have
taken this language to create a presumption of reliance in omission cases; that is, the plaintiff need only prove that a material
see Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 776 (D. Colo. 1964), where
the district court applied the general fraud statute of Colorado because "most acts violative of § 10(b) would be readily cognizable in Colorado as 'constructive fraud', or, indeed,
as traditional common law fraud."
507 F.2d at 1363.
2 406 U.S. 128 (1972). Affiliated Ute held that (at least on the facts of that case) no
reliance need be shown where there were material omissions by the defendants. The
defendants purchased restricted securities from relatively unsophisticated sellers without
telling them that the purchasers could immediately recall the securities at a substantial
profit. The Supreme Court may therefore have found that the sales surely would not have
occurred absent this crucial omission and that factual evidence of reliance was, therefore,
unnecessary.
507 F.2d at 1361.
507 F.2d at 1358, quoting 406 U.S. at 153-54.
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omission has been made, and proof of this in itself establishes
reliance." This may suggest a shift to an objective substitute for
reliance. The question would then be whether the misrepresentation or omission would have been significant to a reasonable
investor rather than whether it actually caused the purchase or
sale decision of the instant plaintiff."
The court in Clegg, despite quoting the above language of
Affiliated Ute, then interpreted Affiliated Ute so that an element
of reliance or causation" in some form remains.
Thus, Allen v. H. K. Porter Co. tends to put Stevens v. VoweU
in context by demonstrating that the broad language of the latter
does not mean necessarily that literal fulfillment of the three elements obviates the necessity of some proof of causation as well as
some species of scienter. It is somewhat ironical that this basic and
sound recognition is somewhat blurred by Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
U.S., supra, in its rejection of the requirement of proof of causation
beyond proof of materiality in the case of omissions to state facts
essential to render what was stated not misleading. But the implications of the Supreme Court's opinion [were] that the element of
causation in some form remained and that some degree of scienter
is requisite. 7

This interpretation of Affiliated Ute, which seems at odds
with the other interpretations of that case, is not entirely consistent with what the court actually did in Clegg. The jury instruc2' See Chelsea Assoc.'s v. Rapanos, No. 74-2114 (6th Cir., Dec. 24, 1975); Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Rochez Bros. v.
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3rd Cir. 1973); SEC v. First Am. Bank & Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673
(8th Cir. 1973); Swanson v. American Consumers Indus. Inc., 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973);
For other examples of recent decisions adopting a presumption in nondisclosure cases, see
Sirota v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 604, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Jenkins v. Fidelity
Bank, 365 F. Supp. 1391, 1398 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Reeder v. Mastercraft Elec. Corp., 363 F.
Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., [1973 Transfer
94,133 at 94,542 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Taylor v. Smith,
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
Barney & Co., 358 F. Supp. 892, 895-96 (D. Utah 1973); Note, The Reliance Requirement
in Private Actions under lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975).
,1 The Tenth Circuit seems to have taken a stronger view on the necessity of reliance
in dictum in earlier cases. See, e.g., Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 517 (10th Cir. 1973) where the court said:
In these same decisions, Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
90 (10th Cir.), and Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir.), we have
expressed the requirement that the plaintiff must also exercise good faith in
its purchase, due diligence, and demonstrate reliance on the acts or inaction
of the defendant.
" Reliance and causation are used interchangeably by most courts, including this
one. See 1 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRrrEs LAw: FRAUD §§ 4.7(555) at 86.13, 4.7(559)(4) at 86.39.
1 507 F.2d at 1359.
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tion on reliance, which was neither criticized nor challenged by
the appellate court and which the appellate court said was in
harmony with Affiliated Ute,25 expressly and clearly did not require that reliance be established where the conduct in question
was an omission of material fact. 2 The problem, perhaps, is that
the Tenth Circuit does not clearly distinguish between misrepresentations, where reliance must be demonstrated, and omissions,
where it may be sufficient to infer reliance or simply dispense
with it altogether provided that the omitted facts were sufficiently material. It is, after all, difficult to prove a hypothetical
negative, i.e., that plaintiff would not have purchased or sold the
securities if defendant had not omitted to tell him all the material
facts.
3.

Scienter

Scienter, which was largely ignored by the parties and by the
trial court, was the issue to which the appellate court devoted
virtually its entire opinion. However, instead of analyzing the
reasoning behind its scienter rule, the opinion was devoted to a
not altogether convincing effort to show that the Tenth Circuit
position on scienter has been consistent; the court concluded that
there is a "strong strand of consistency and reason running
through the decisions of this court on the subject under discussion
beginning with Stevens v. VowelU which is readily discerned when
viewed as a whole," 3 0 and that the "strong strand of consistency"
is that "there is required something additional by way of scienter
' 31
or conscious fault than mere negligence."
The basic problem with this conclusion is that it was reached
in a factual vacuum.32 The court said that mere negligence is not
enough to establish a case under 10b-5, but negligent conduct was
507 F.2d at 1355.
" For the instruction on reliance, see note 13 supra.

507 F.2d at 1361.
31

Id.

32 The court did not consider the factual settings in its discussions of the other Tenth
Circuit opinions, dismissing them in a footnote with this language:
We have been able to cover only the major thrusts of the opinions with
reference to these limited aspects and with little reference to the circumstances individually involved . . . . We have not been concerned here with burden of proof, criminal cases, expressly authorized causes of action, enforcement proceedings as distinguished from private civil actions, nor with other
unraised problems in this complicated field.
Id. n.13.
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not the question before it. The court specifically declared that the
conduct of this defendant was "necessarily pursued knowingly
and intentionally and with purpose to mislead.

'3

This unfortun-

ately is exactly what the Tenth Circuit (and in fairness, be it
noted, many other courts) have done time and again. An attempt
is made to define a 10b-5 scienter rule broad enough to cover all
cases when the case before the court can be decided on a much
narrower and more precise basis. The result is cloudy dictum that
does little to assist either courts or parties in applying the rule to
subsequent cases.
A second problem with the court's conclusion that something
more than mere negligence must be established is that it does not
follow from the language of Gilbert v. Nixon3 and Mitchell v.
Texas Gulf Sulfur Co. ,5 which the court cited as authority.

The Gilbert court said:
One is not to be held liable, because of his misleading misrepresentation or omission of material fact, the truth of the matter being
unknown to the purchaser, if the party responsible for the misrepresentation or omission sustains the burden of proving that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known
that it was a misrepresentation or omission."

The language of the Mitchell court was:
Confronted with the abundance of evidence in the record, we
cannot conclude that TGS sustained its burden of proving that it
did not know of the misrepresentation, nor was it demonstrated that
with due diligence
TGS could not have known of the faultiness of
37
the statement.

Two conclusions may be drawn from this language: (1) The
burden of proving scienter is not on the plaintiff since the defendant must prove lack of scienter; and (2) negligent conduct is
actionable under 10b-5, since a defendant cannot sustain his burden of proof if he is negligent, that is, if he cannot demonstrate
the exercise of reasonable care or due diligence.
Opposite conclusions were set forth in dictum by the Clegg
court. The court clearly said that negligent conduct alone is not
actionable; and, although the court did not expressly determine

15

Id. at 1362.
429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970).
446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
429 F.2d at 357.
446 F.2d at 102.
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which party has the burden of proof, it would seem to follow that
scienter must be established by the plaintiff since scienter is an
essential element of a 10b-5 cause of action.
To the writers it appears that the Clegg court unnecessarily
undertook to clarify the Tenth Circuit's position on scienter and
to demonstrate that the emerging rule is compatible with earlier
cases. It is submitted that the Clegg opinion is not altogether
successful in either endeavor and, moreover, that the conclusion-that mere negligence can never create 10b-5 liability-may
not be a satisfactory rule.
The Clegg decision will inevitably require reconsideration or
at least reiteration in a case where the scienter requirement can
be met only if the court considers the negligent conduct of the
defendant. In this event, the writers suggest the issue might most
constructively be viewed from the following perspectives, which
have been used by commentators and other courts. A consideration from these perspectives can give the bar and the courts a
legal framework in which future scienter problems may be more
carefully and usefully analyzed.
A.

II. PERSPECTIVES ON SCIENTER
Language Perspective
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors. 8

Rule 10b-5 promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) is:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly, or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any devise, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact, or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
-15

U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
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made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security"

The Clegg court, in justifying its refusal to overturn the trial
court's judgment, said that a layman would read the language of
rule 10b-5 to require a showing of some kind of fault beyond mere
carelessness.40 The view of the commentators, who are expressing
a legal analysis rather than a layman's probable reaction, however, is that the language of rule 10b-5 does not necessarily require an element of scienter in misrepresentation or partial omission cases actionable under 10b-5 of the rule." This view suggests
that, while intention may be necessary to demonstrate the fraudulent or deceitful conduct described by 10b-5(a) and (c), it may
not be an essential element of 10b-5(b), which prohibits the mere
making of an untrue statement or the omission to state a material
fact which would make the statement made in light of the circumstances not misleading.4 2 Thus, they would reason that, in
the Clegg case, some form of scienter would be required to make
the material omissions actionable under 10b-5(a) and (c), but
would not be essential to make the material misstatements and
half-truths actionable under 10b-5(b). Courts, however, have generally avoided this language analysis, no doubt because it is not
always clear that any given conduct falls exclusively within any
43
one of the three categories.
B.

Reconciliation Perspective
The primary reason that courts have had difficulty determin-

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
, 507 F.2d at 1362.
See I A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 § 13, at 1-183 (1st ed. 1974); 3 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1442 (2d ed. 1961); Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private
Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule l0b-5, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1070, 1075 (1965); Comment,
Negligent MisrepresentationsUnder Rule lOb-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 824, 826 (1965).
'"
See note 41 supra. It has been argued, however, that, if the rule does not require

scienter, the rule is broader than the statute, which does require some form of intent. See
1 A. JACOBS, supra note 41, § 13, at 1-183 to -184. The argument was mentioned, but not
dealt with, by the Tenth Circuit in Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973). See also Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228
F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
'" See 1 A. JACOBS, supra note 41, § 63, at 3-138; Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule iob-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 824, 827 (1965). A material misstatement,

for example, might come within all three sections.
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ing whether or not scienter is a required element of rule 10b-5 is
their attempt to rationalize the remedy under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act 44 with that of rule 10b-5.4 5 Section 12(2) provides
an express remedy for defrauded buyers as follows:
Any person who offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 3, other than paragraph (2) of
subsection (a) thereof), by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading
(the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who
shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such
security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any
court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for
such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income
received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages
if he no longer owns the security."

Section 12(2) provides a remedy for conduct which is also
actionable under rule 10b-5, a not remarkable coincidence since
the language of rule 10b-5 is virtually identical to that of section
12(2)." 7 Unlike 10b-5 the substantive and procedural elements of
section 12(2) are expressly prescribed. While a buyer need not
prove scienter4 9 or reliance,o he must be in privity with his seller,"'
must bring his suit within 1 year after the misstatement was or
should have been discovered or in any case 3 years after the sale, 2
and may be required to post a security bond.5 3 Since actions
4 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
" See Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 770 (D. Colo. 1964); Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations
Under Rule lOb-5, 32 U. CI. L. REv. 824, 827 (1965).
" 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
17 See text accompanying note 39 supra.
11Because the civil remedy under 10b-5 arose by implication in Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), there are no express elements of the rule
delineated either in the statute or in the rule itself.
ig 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
IId.
Id.
' 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970).
53 Id.
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under 10b-5 are not subject to the shorter period of limitations5 4
and since privity need not be established," courts fear that should
they further liberalize 10b-5 by eliminating the requirements of
reliance and scienter, they will effectively write section 12(2) out
of the Securities Act.5" Although this argument is not made by the
Clegg court, the result of the decision is to differentiate the two
remedies by requiring that the plaintiff in a 10b-5 action demonstrate something more than mere negligence while the plaintiff in
a section 12(2) action need not plead nor prove any degree of
scienter.
C.

Policy Prospective

If the sole policy goals of the federal securities laws are-as
some argue-to protect the investor, to maintain integrity and
honesty in the securities market, and to curb unnecessary, unwise, and destructive speculation,57 then scienter should be eliminated, because these goals can best be served by punishing all
material misrepresentations and omissions regardless of the intent of the defendant. However, another relevant policy consideration is fairness to the individual investor who innocently
makes a material misrepresentation or omission and, thereby,
with the elimination of privity, is subject to suit from all potential
purchasers and sellers of that stock.59 The policy goals of the
111

A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, § 2.5(1), at 41-42 (1974).
5 1 A. JACOBS. supra note 41, § 62, at 3-126 to -128.

' The court in Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo.
1964), quoted the following reasoning of Judge Kirkpatrick in Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124-25 (E.D. Pa. 1948):
It cannot be supposed that Congress intended to abolish these regulations
and limitations [coupled to a § 11, § 12(1) or § 12(2) actionl when it enacted
Sec. 10 of the Act of 1934. By any reasonable rule of statutory interpretation,

it would require either an express repeal or an implication of repeal so strong
as to be inescapable. The two Acts are unquestionably in pari materia and
must be construed together to make a consistent whole. Looking at them as

one statute it is simply not possible that Congress, having prescribed in
elaborate detail procedural requirements which must be fulfilled in order to
enforce civil liability attaching to a carefully defined type of violation, would
have casually nullified them all in a later section.
228 F. Supp. at 770.
57 See Comment, Negligent MisrepresentationsUnder Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.

824, 829 (1965).
:1 Id. at 830.
1 Concern with the potential of tremendous liability under the Securities Exchange
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securities laws can be substantially served, without resulting in
undue unfairness, by requiring that the defendant act with some
degree of fault such as negligence, recklessness, or intent. The
Clegg court never expressly mentioned policy considerations, but
potential unfairness to the defendant was no doubt in the court's
mind when it required some showing of conscious fault greater
than mere negligence. In so doing, it may be argued, the court
gave too much weight to potential unfairness to the investor who
may be sued and not enough to the interest of the investor who
may be misled.
A.

III.
Burden of Proof

BEYOND CLEGG V. CONK

One result of requiring that something additional by way of
scienter or conscious fault be established in 10(b) actions may be
that the burden of proving scienter or conscious fault is now on
the plaintiff.6 0 Although this would align the Tenth Circuit with
most of the other courts and the commentators,"' it does represent
a departure from the recent past wherein the burden of proving
2
lack of scienter was on the defendent.
B.

Reliance or Causation in Fact

Clegg takes a position on reliance which the court said is
compatible with Affiliated Ute and which indeed seems to be
compatible." Based on the instructions given at trial, Clegg
Act may have been an implicit consideration of the Supreme Court in United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S.Ct. 2051 (1975), and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975), where the application of the securities law was restricted.
See also Comment, Negligent MisrepresentationsUnder Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
824, 834-35 (1965), which urges that this potential liability might have an in terrorem
effect on the conscientious investor, causing him to refrain from investing, which would
place an unhealthy restriction on the volume of securities transactions.
" But see 507 F.2d at 1362:
The latter [state general fraud statutes of limitations] are more adaptable
to the remedial purposes of implied rights of action under Section 10(b),
despite the seemingly paradoxical adoption in special circumstances of the
burden of proof provisions of the 1933 Act in furtherance of the remedial
purposes of the 1934 Act (footnotes omitted).
" See 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, § 8.4(506), at 204.109 (1974); E.
GADSBY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §
5.03[1j[dj, at 5-32 (1970).
6 See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970).
' See text accompanying notes 20-29 supra.
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stands for the proposition that actual reliance must be shown by
the plaintiff in a case involving a misstatement, but that in the
case of an omission no reliance is necessary, only a showing of
materiality. Second, the Clegg court suggested in a footnote that
the "over-strained and super-annuated" workhorse, "reliance,"
be put to pasture and succeeded by its more adaptable offspring,
"causation in fact.""4 Hickman v. Groesbeck, 5 a recent case in
the Utah District Court, interpreted this language broadly by
stating that Clegg requires not only reliance in making the purchase or sale but a causative relationship between such reliance
and damages suffered."0 It does not appear that any direct language in Clegg supports such an interpretation, nor does the language of Hickman seem to be more than dictum in that case.
However, if Hickman represents any kind of a trend, the Tenth
Circuit will no doubt soon have occasion to review the concept of
reliance or "causation in fact" in greater depth.
507 F.2d at 1361 n.14.
, 389 F. Supp. 769 (D. Utah 1974).
"
Causation is an essential element of any tort action. Properly considered, it has two elements: cause in fact and proximate cause. Cause in fact
embraces both positive acts and passive conditions which have so contributed to the result that without them it would not have occurred. Cause in
fact is often expressed as the "but for" test, and courts have felt a need to
limit the "but for" test in its application. Materiality has often been a
limiting factor in this test, and, as such, the test can be stated in broader
terms as: "The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material
element and a substantial factor in bringing it about." W. Prosser, Law of
Torts 240 (4th ed. 1971). "Under Rule 10b-5, the materiality and reliance
requirements are best classified as cause in fact elements." Cobine, supra
Note 9, at 656.
Proximate cause is a far more complex question because it involves
questions of legal policy. "It has been suggested that the question of proximate cause is not really a question of causation at all, but rather a question
of whether the defendant was under a duty to the plaintiff, or whether
defendant's duty required him to protect plaintiff from the event which did
in fact occur." Cobine, supra, Note 9 at 653. The proximate cause or duty
question is answered in 10b-5 litigation by the rule itself: The defendant
should not commit any of the acts proscribed in the rule in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
Cause in fact and proximate cause (duty) are not new concepts in tort
analysis. Both cause in fact and duty must be determined in each case. A
tort analysis approach which stresses either one cannot properly decide a
case at the total exculsion of the other.
Id. at 778 n.18.
"
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Defining Scienter or Conscious Fault

Albeit by way of dictum, Clegg does clarify the Tenth Circuit's position on scienter by stating that there must be established "something additional by way of scienter or conscious fault
than mere negligence" "-something like "scienter, conscious
fault, intention or recklessness." 8 Prior Tenth Circuit cases cited
with favor by the Clegg court and further dictum in the Clegg
opinion give some helpful definitional interpretation to this otherwise vague requirement. First, one consistent declaration of the
Tenth Circuit cases, 9 which is reaffirmed by Clegg, is that 10b-5
is not the equivalent of common law fraud.
The emphasis in Stevens v. Vowell of the necessity of a flexible
interpretation of the security laws to cover all conduct, schemes and
contrivances within its scope independently of the rigid requirements of common law fraud has been often quoted. We reaffirm that
essential principle as it constitutes the hallmark, genius and
strength of modern securities legislation."'

Therefore, conscious fault includes something less than the intent
requirement described in common law fraud cases.
Further, dicta in the Clegg opinion may be read as indicating
that the conscious fault standard will vary depending upon the
circumstances of particular cases.
In determining how much more, or the existence of other required
elements in view of the circumstances of particular cases, there must
be kept constantly in mind the teaching of Stevens v. Vowell that
the federal securities acts are not frozen into the old common law
patterns; and that they must be interpreted flexibly and progressively, not technically nor grudgingly, to fairly effectuate their remedial purpose. Thus this court has consistently resisted and surmounted common law obstacles against relief from schemes, artifices, and courses of conduct where conscious fault designed to cause
damages to either buyers or sellers of securities has been perceivable. "Nor has this court attempted to specify what forms of deception are prohibited; rather we have held that 'all fraudulentschemes
in connection with the purchase and sale of securities are prohibited.' " Allen v. Porter, 452 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1971), supra. But this
court has repeatedly declined to extend the acts to cases of simple
7 507 F.2d at 1361.
Id. at 1362.
Allen v. H.K. Porter Co., 452 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1971); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Stevens v. Vowell,
343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
10507 F.2d at 1355.
'
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negligence not involving some fraudulent purpose or species of scien7
ter within their scope and purpose. '

Assuming that the Tenth Circuit is receptive to a shifting
scienter standard, the problem would be to define the factors
which will vary the degree of scienter required in a particular
case. The Ninth Circuit in White v. Abrams,7" in substituting a
duty analysis for the scienter requirement, outlined five elements
to be taken into account in determining the degree of duty that
a defendant might have to a potential plaintiff:
(1) The relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff;
(2) the defendant's access to the information as compared to the
plaintiff;
(3) the benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship;
(4) the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying
upon their relationship in making his investment decision and;
(5) the defendant's activity in initiating the securities transaction
in question."

Professor Bromberg suggested other possible considerations:
A comprehensive scienter standard would have to fit the enormous
variation of 10b-5 private suits, including
(1) Whether the violation is misrepresentation, nondisclosure or
some more complex scheme or manipulation;
(2) Whether there is privity, a lesser relationship (such as aidingabetting or conspiracy) or no privity. at all (as in insider trading
cases); in the parlance of this text, whether the transactions are
direct or indirect, personal or impersonal;
(3) Whether there is one plaintiff or thousands;
(4) Whether there is some special relationship between the parties,
such as fiduciary-beneficiary or broker-customer;
(5) Whether the relief sought is damages, rescission, injunction or
something else.74

Although Clegg can, of course, not be interpreted as adopting
any version of the duty analysis suggested by White v. Abrams,75
that court's approach could be useful in defining the varying
standard of scienter that may now be law in the Tenth Circuit.
That is, the type of scienter required to establish liability could
71

Id. at 1361-62.

72495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
7' Id. at 735-36.
7, 2 A. BROMBERG, SECU~rrEs LAW: FRAUD, § 8.4 (513) at 204.115 (1974).
" 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). But cf. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d
90, 100 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), where the court seemed to be
suggesting a duty analysis.
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vary depending on certain relevant factors such as those identified in White and by Professor Bromberg. For example, to meet
such a flexible scienter standard, a plaintiff in an agency relation
to the defendant need only prove gross negligence, while a plaintiff dealing with the defendant in an arm's length transaction
must establish actual knowledge.76
However, the Clegg court, while urging flexibility in interpreting the securities laws,77 significantly limited its flexibility by
expressly requiring something more than simple negligence for a
finding of liability-a requirement which is at variance with both
dicta and holdings in earlier cases, regardless of the court's insistence on its underlying "strand of consistency."" For example, in
Gilbert v. Nixon79 the defendant was dealing with the plaintiffbuyers through an intermediary. Plaintiffs sued on the theory
that the defendant violated 10b-5 because he failed to discover
the correct depth of a dry hole when he should have known that
the reported depth was incorrect but did not. Although the trial
court found that the defendant had in general met his burden of
proving that he exercised due care, the appellate court remanded
for a specific finding that the defendant exercised due care in this
specific representation even though he had no reason to doubt the
accuracy of the information on which the representation was
made. Under the new standard of scienter, the court would not
have the flexibility to make this decision.
Further, it is not clear from the Clegg opinion that a court
might find scienter where there is recklessness or gross negligence.
Although the court seemed to refer in passing to recklessness as
a species of scienter, 0 in a prior footnote" the court had suggested
,See generally Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace
the Catch Phrasesof Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1206 (1970). For a recent
case which applies the flexible duty standard, see Eichen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., (S.D. Cal.,
Sept. 2, 1975), BNA SEC. L. REP., No. 319 at A-8 to A-9.
" 507 F.2d at 1361.
" Id. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
79 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970).
See 507 F.2d at 1362.
9
Perhaps part of the difficulty with the elements of "scienter" and "reliance" in application stems from the words themselves rather than broad
concepts. From the common law these words have been transported by name
into an environment inhospitable to at least part of what they meant in their
old one. It may be that "reliance" and "scienter" at length will have carried
the load long enough in the securities context so that as faithful but over-
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that scienter should be put to rest and succeeded by "conscious
fault." Does "conscious fault" include recklessness or does it suggest actual knowledge? The better view is that the court's strong
predeliction for flexibility would define conscious fault as including the kind of constructive knowledge present in cases of recklessness or gross negligence.
In clarifying whether scienter includes gross or simple negligence, a court must face close and difficult questions: Should the
securities laws provide a remedy against an agent or other fiduciary who fails to meet a high duty of care, or should the securities
laws be limited to legitimate areas of federal concern, prescribing
sanctions for deceptive behavior and leaving violations of trust to
state common law principles?
The Tenth Circuit may well find that it is brash to attempt
to answer such questions adequately in a factual vacuum. It may
be soon enough to answer when a proper case requires a holding
on simple negligence. Until then we suspect that Clegg may not
be the final word on scienter in the Tenth Circuit.
CONCLUSION

In summary, Clegg adds nothing new to Tenth Circuit law
on the applicable statute of limitations or on reliance in 10b-5
cases. It does seem to change the burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff, requiring the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant acted with scienter. Finally, Clegg does attempt to
explain, justify, and clarify at some length the scienter standard
in the Tenth Circuit. Its conclusion is that such standard must
stop some place short of simple negligence. This statement is,
however, only dictum and may prove to be no more final than the
gratuitous dictum set forth in so many other 10b-5 cases.
strained and superannuated work horses they may be put out to pasture
while their more adaptable offspring "causation in fact", Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972), and "conscious fault", take
up the burden except for limited services in more suitable fields.
Id. at 1361 n.14.
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PROMISSORY NOTES AND THE SECURITIES ACTS

Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974)
Barrow v. Ellingson, No. 74-1735 (10th Cir., July
30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication)
By

JOHN

L.

TRAYLOR*

For a number of years, federal courts have extended the application of the federal securities laws and the remedies afforded
thereunder to an increasing number of subtle and innovative investment schemes.' Most recently the federal courts have confronted the issue of whether promissory notes are securities within
the meaning and purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 Most of these courts have concluded that the application of the acts depends upon a characterization of the instrument as commercial or investment-a distinction which is often difficult to make in the varied transactional
facts encountered in securities litigation. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals has now joined in the effort to define when a
promissory note is or is not a security. In one case the court
concluded that the promissory notes were indeed securities subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act;4 in another
case the court found that the note was not a security.'
The plaintiff in Zabriskie v. Lewis6 alleged violations of rule
10b-5 7 and the Utah Blue Sky Law8 in connection with an investment and financing arrangement involving the defendant's promissory notes. The plaintiff had engaged a real estate agent to
locate investment properties. The agent's supervisor arranged a
* Associate, Rovira, Demuth & Eiberger, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1968, Northwestern University; M.A., 1972, Northwestern University; J.D., 1974, University of Denver
College of Law.
See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); Hart & Homer, Some Credit Aspects of
Unconventional Securities, 25 MERCER L. REV. 395 (1974).
2 15 U.S.C. §
77a-77aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Securities Act].
Id. §§ 78a-78jj (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Exchange Act].
Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974).
Barrow v. Ellingson, No. 74-1735 (10th Cir., July 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
a 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974).
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
' UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-1 (1968).
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meeting with the plaintiff to discuss a proposal of loaning money
to a John Worthen to be used to promote Dax Corporation, which,
according to the supervisor, "was to be one of the greatest stock
developments that he had ever heard of."9 The plaintiff agreed
to the proposal and loaned $15,000 to Worthen in exchange for a
short-term 2-month promissory note signed by Worthen for
$17,250 including interest. As security for the note, plaintiff was
given a stock certificate of 1,000,000 shares of Computer Parking
Systems, Inc. and a hypothecation agreement covering the
shares. Ten days later, the plaintiff loaned Worthen an additional
$7,000 and received a short-term promissory note for $8,400 from
J.E.W., Inc., Worthen's closely-held corporation. This note was
secured by the assignment of another note of $12,500 issued by
Pacific Flight Support, Inc. to J.E.W., Inc.
The notes were not paid when due, although the plaintiff did
receive $3,500 in part payment. The plaintiff then attempted to
collect on the collateral, but she discovered that the Computer
stock was non-negotiable and that Pacific Flight was no longer in
business. She, therefore, filed suit against the real estate agent
and his supervisor, contending that they had induced her to loan
money to J.E.W., Inc. through fraud and misrepresentations;,"
she recovered judgment in the amount of $26,373.39. On appeal
the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The appellants contended that the notes should not be
deemed to be securities for two reasons. In the first place, they
argued that the definition of a security in the Exchange Act excludes short-term notes" and that the notes in issue were, therefore, statutorily excepted from rule 10b-5. The Tenth Circuit concluded, as have other circuits, that the exclusion applies only to
"prime quality negotiable commercial paper' '1 3 and not to investment paper such as the notes in issue. The appellants also argued
that the notes should not be deemed to be securities by definition
"because they are not the type of notes Congress intended federal
securities law to regulate."' 4 Citing decisions from the Second,'"
507 F.2d at 548.
Id. at 549.
"
'

§ 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
See notes 41-46 and accompanying text infra.
507 F.2d at 550.
Id.

'

(1973).

Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908
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Third, 6 and Fifth" Circuits, the court acknowledged that "not all
notes are included within the protection of the anti-fraud provisions""8 of the securities laws and implicitly adopted the nowfamiliar test of placing notes of a commercial character beyond
the definition of a security while placing notes of an investment
character within the definition." On the basis of this distinction
and aided by the fact that shares of stock had been pledged as
security in one transaction, the court concluded that the defendant's promissory notes had been given to obtain investment capital to promote a corporation and that they were, therefore, securities. Furthermore, these notes were sold within the meaning of
rule 10b-5 since they were "disposed of" for value.'" "[T]he issuance of a note which is the formal equivalent of the issuance of
shares of stock would be covered by the Act."'"
In the second case, Barrow v. Ellingson,22 the plaintiffs, as
owners of stock in American Western Life Insurance Company
(American), brought consolidated class and derivative actions
against American, American Western Marketing Company (Marketing), and others asserting violations of section 10b and rule
10b-5 of the Exchange Act on the basis that the promissory note
involved in this transaction constituted a security.
American, a company engaged in the life insurance business,
had entered into an agreement with Marketing, a company engaged in recruiting, training, and management of insurance
agents. Marketing agreed to furnish insurance agents to American, who in return agreed to compensate Marketing for its services. Marketing also agreed to guarantee to pay American any
advances due it from agents who defaulted and who had been
provided by Marketing. This agreement was subsequently
amended after American had advanced funds to some agents who
were later terminated before repaying these funds to American.
Because American claimed that Marketing was the guarantor of
such advances, Marketing agreed, inter alia, to execute a note in
" Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
" McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
930 (1975).
507 F.2d at 550.
"Id. at 551.
Id. at 552.
21 Id., quoting McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 352 F. Supp. 454, 460 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
No. 74-1735 (10th Cir., July 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
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favor of American in the amount of $195,620 which represented
those funds advanced to agents which were uncollectable. American also waived any claim it had against Marketing for repayment of the advances.
The plaintiff shareholders contended that their stock suffered a diminution in value as a result of these transactions and
that the "single integrated transaction" of the agreement, the
amendment, and the note constituted the sale and purchase of a
security. The District Court for the District of Utah dismissed
their action, holding that the note was not a security based upon
the distinction between the commercial and investment character of instruments." On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
In adopting a context-over-text approach to the issue, the
court found that "[tihis transaction, although possibly within
the 'letter' of the statute, was not within the statute because it
was not within its 'spirit' or 'the intention of its makers.' ",24The
financial and business context of this transaction demonstrated
that the amendment and note had been executed to settle an
obligation "arising out of a continuing business relationship over
a number of years." 5 The transaction, therefore, represented a
commercial rather than an investment venture.
The decisions in Zabriskie and Barrow provide useful counterpoints to illustrate the distinction other circuits have been
attempting to make in defining when a promissory note is or is
not a security. The critical factor in analyzing the application of
the securities acts is the factual context of the transaction as
opposed to the seemingly literal meaning of the federal statutes. 6
Promissory notes are treated somewhat differently in the
Securities Act than in the Exchange Act. Section 2(1) of the
Securities Act provides: "When used in this subchapter, unless
the context otherwise requires, the term 'security' means any
note." But section 3(a)(3) of that Act provides the following
exemption from registration and prospectus requirements for
some short-term notes:
IId. at 5.

24 Id. at 12.

Id. at 5.
26 See, Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of 'Security' Under Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: A Note Is a Note Is a Note? 52 NEB. L. REV. 478 (1973).
-15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
,5
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Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this
title shall not apply to any of the following classes of secutities:
Any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which
arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have been
or are to be used for current transactions, and which has a maturity
at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.28

However, section 12(2) provides that this exemption is inapplicable with respect to the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act.2
On the other hand, the Exchange Act by definition rather
than by separate exemption excludes similar short-term notes
from application of its provisions, principally by the anti-fraud
constraints of section 10b and rule 10b-5:
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:
The term "security" means any note ... but shall not include...
any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has
a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months,
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of
which is likewise limited."

Based upon this configuration of language, the Second and Seventh Circuits recognized that, while such notes may be excluded
by definition from the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act,
they would not be similarly exempted from the anti-fraud provi3
sions of the Securities Act. '
In attempting to provide some guidelines for application of
the exemption provisions for short-term notes in the Securities
Act, the SEC issued the following interpretative release in 1961:
The legislative history of the act makes it clear that section
3(a)(3) applies only to prime quality negotiable paper of a type not
28 Id.

§ 77c(a)(3).
11Id. § 771(2).
3 Id. § 78c(a)(10). In addition to section 10b and rule lOb-5, such notes would also
be excluded from the anti-fraud provisions of section 15(c)(i), id. § 78o(c)(1), and section
20, id. § 78t; from the provision in section 15(a)(1) for registration of brokers and dealers,
id. § 78o(aJ(1); from section 18, id. § 78r, imposing liability for misleading statements;
and from sections 17 and 21, id. §§ 78q, 78u, conferring investigative and prosecutorial
powers on the Commission.
31 Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
908 (1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972). See, Harrington, Use of the Proceeds of Commercial Paper Issued
by Bank Holding Companies, 29 Bus. LAW. 207, 212-14 (1973).
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ordinarily purchased by the general public, that is, paper used to
facilitate well recognized types of current operational business requirements and of a type eligible for discounting by Federal Reserve
Banks."

One aspect of that legislative history further clarifies the
purpose and intent of the short-term note exemption:
The [Federal Reserve] Board had urged the exemption under section 3(a)(3) because it believed that the proposed act was intended
to apply only to stocks, bonds, debentures, and other similar securities of the kind commonly known as investment securities, which are
issued for the purpose of obtaining capital funds for business enterprises and are purchased by persons for investment . . . . [The
Act] was not intended to apply . . . to short-term paper issued for

the purpose of obtaining funds for current transactions in commerce,
industry, or agriculture and purchased by banks3 and corporations
as a means of employing temporarily idle funds. 1

It has been suggested that this interpretation of the exemption in
the Securities Act is equally applicable to the exclusion contained
in the Exchange Act. 4
3 SEC Release No. 33-4412, 17 C.F.R. § 231.4412 (1961). The justification for recognizing an exemption in the Securities Act and an exclusion in the Exchange Act for shortterm commercial paper is suggested by the commercial context in which this paper was
historically used at the time the Acts were drafted:
Funds received from the issuance of commercial paper have traditionally
been used to finance current operational business expenditures of a welldefined seasonal or periodic nature. The underlying theory is that during the
short period from the date of the paper's issuance to its maturity [1-9
months], the borrower will complete a cycle in which the cash obtained at
the beginning of the transaction is transformed into commodities through the
process of manufacture and sale and then converted back into cash at the
end of the transaction through the collection of the proceeds of the sale. In a
successful cycle, the completion of the operation that gave rise to the loan
provides the funds for retiring the paper, thus rendering it self-liquidating.
Note, The Commercial PaperMarket and the Securities Acts, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 362, 364
(1972) (footnote omitted). However, it has been suggested that "a significant proportion
of the commercial paper currently in existence [today] does not conform to [the] criteria" contained in the SEC Release. Id. at 386.
11 Letter from Chester Morrill, Secretary, Federal Reserve Board to Senator Duncan
U. Fletcher, April 3, 1933, in Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 120 (1933). See also Comment, Securities Regulation
-Commercial Paper-PromissoryNotes with Maturity Not Exceeding Nine Months
but Offered to Public as Investment Are "Securities" Within Section 3(a)(10) of the 1934
Act, 26 VAND. L. REv. 874 (1973).
11 Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
908 (1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1079-80 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972); Anderson v. Francis I. du Pont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 708 (D.
Minn. 1968).
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Nevertheless, some courts have favored a literal reading of
the definition of a security and have tended to ignore the statutory proscription that the context should furnish the guide to
applicability or nonapplicability of the securities acts.3 As one
court observed:
From the plain language of the statute [section 3(a)(10)] a promissory note is a "security" unless the context otherwise requires, and
in general, the definition of security has been literally read by
courts, the result being that almost all notes are held to be securities.'

Most of the more recent cases have involved alleged violations of section 10b and rule 10b-5, as did both of the Tenth
Circuit cases. The courts have focused their attention less on the
literal text of the statutes and more on the economic context of
the transactions complained of. 37 This analytical approach has

facilitated the development of the distinction between commercial and investment paper first as it affects short-term notes, and,
more recently, as it applies to all notes in seeming disregard of
the explicit language of the statute. However, as the Tenth Circuit appropriately observed in Zabriskie: "Making the distinction
between commercial and investment notes . . . is often diffi-

cult.""8

11See, e.g., Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973) (alleged lOb-5
violations); Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 923 (1954) (criminal fraud under section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act); SEC v.
Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709, 721 (N.D. Tex. 1961) (selling unregistered securities in violation of section 5 of the Securities Act); Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of
'Security' Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note Is a Note Is a Note? 52 NEB. L.
REV. 478 (1973).
11 Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307, 313 (E.D. Mo. 1971). See
also Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are (Are Not?) Always Securities-A Review, 29 Bus. LAW.
861 (1974).
7 The court in Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1974), acknowledged

that
the literal definitions [of a security] begin with the word "note." Plaintiff
. . . argues that the words "any note" mean exactly that-any note-and
that this Court should adopt a literal interpretation of those definitional

sections. Defendants argue that while notes are literally covered by the acts,
the Congress intended, and the courts have usually required, some showing
of the commercial setting in which the alleged transactions took place. ...
Id. at 786. In adopting the defendants' argument but concluding nevertheless that the
notes were securities, the court held that "the commercial setting, or economic realities,
of the transaction is relevant in interpreting the term 'security' even where the device at
issue is a note." Id. at 787.
11507 F.2d at 551. See also, Kerby v. Commodity Resources, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 786,
791 (D. Colo. 1975).

SECURITIES

In construing the application of the securities laws to promissory notes, more courts are implicitly recognizing the statutory
caveat that "[tihe term 'security' means any note," "unless the
context otherwise requires." 39 To a large extent, the context is
dictated by the statutory purpose of the Acts. Anti-fraud securities legislation is to be read "not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes"' 0 to protect investors.
The Acts generally do not contemplate protection for consumer
or commercial loan transactions. The commercial-investment
dichotomy has been important with respect to short-term notes
and the anti-fraud provisions of section 10b and rule 10b-5. The
Seventh Circuit was one of the first to hold that the exclusion in
section 3(a)(10) for short-term notes from the remedial sanctions
of the Exchange Act applied to "commercial paper, not investment securities."" Similarly, the Second," Fifth, and Tenth"
Circuits have held that the exclusion of short-term notes from the
Act is inapplicable to investment paper. To the extent that shortterm investment paper is not within the exclusion of section
3(a)(10), therefore, the focus on context restricts the mechanical
application of that provision. The Fifth Circuit stated in Bellah
3,This language is contained in the definitional sections of both Acts; in the Securities Act of 1933 at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970), and in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
at id. § 78c(a)(10). As the court suggested in United Sportfishers v. Buffo, 396 F. Supp.
310, 312 (S.D. Cal. 1975): "A literal construction of the [Exchange] Act should not be
employed to expand the scope of the securities legislation to encompass transactions and
instruments that are not of an investment nature."
,0SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,195 (1963); see Zabriskie
v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 550 (10th Cir. 1974); Barrow v. Ellingson, No. 74-1735 (10th Cir.,
July 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication) at 6-7.
[A security should be viewed as] a transaction whose characteristics distinguish it from the generality of transactions so as to create a need for the
special fraud procedures, protections, and remedies provided by the securities law.
Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?
18 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 367, 373 (1967).
" Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1009 (1972).
" Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
908 (1973).
It does not follow. . . that every transaction ..
which involves promissory
notes, whether of less or more than nine months maturity, is within Rule lOb5. The Act is for the protection of investors, and its provisions must be read
accordingly.
Id. at 800.
,"Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1112 (5th Cir. 1974).
" Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551 (10th Cir. 1974).
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v. First National Bank45 that "exclusive reliance on the maturity
date of the note [is] misplaced" after noting that "the exemption for short-term paper under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 applies only to commercial paper and not investment
paper."'46
More recently, however, the Fifth Circuit has eroded the significance of the exclusion even further by holding the remedies
in the Exchange Act inapplicable to long-term commercial paper
as well. 7
We realize that our holding today that the Act does not apply
to commercial notes of a longer duration than nine months, taken
with the decisions voiding the short-term exemption as to investment paper, virtually writes that exemption out of the law. On
[the] one hand, the Act covers all investment notes, no matter how
short their maturity, because they are not encompassed by the "any
note" language of the exemption. On the other hand, the Act does
not cover any commercial notes, no matter how long their maturity,
because they fall outside the "any note" definition of a security.
Thus, the investment or commercial nature of a note entirely controls the applicability of the Act, depriving of all utility the exemption based on maturity-length. The original scrivener of the definitional section may well wonder what happened to his carefully
drawn exemption on the way to the courthouse, but if the judicial
decisions do not properly reflect the intent of Congress as to the
coverage of the Act, only that body can properly rectify the situation
at this point, if stare decisis is to apply and the Supreme Court does
not make some definitive decision contrary to the presently decided
cases.48

Following the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has also
placed principal reliance upon the characterization of the transaction as commercial or investment in disregard of the exclusion
provision:
45495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
,1 Id. at 1112. See also, City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 290 F. Supp. 592 (W.D. Ark.
1968), aff'd, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970) (10b-5 is inapplicable to commercial notes).
The nature of the offering and the use of the proceeds are useful considerations in determining the "investment" character of the notes. Where the
notes are nothing more than part and parcel of a commercial financing
venture . . . the notes are not securities within the ambit of the statutes.
United Sportfishers v. Buffo, 396 F. Supp. 310, 313 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
41McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
930 (1975) (1-year note). See also Comment, Definition of a Security: Long-Term Promissory Notes, 35 LA. L. REV. 570 (1975).
1 497 F.2d at 494-95.

1976

SECURITIES
The ultimate question is whether the plaintiffs are simply borrowers in a commercial transaction who are not protected by the
1934 Act or investors in a securities transaction who are protected.
In one sense every lender of money is an investor since he places
his money at risk in anticipation of a profit in the form of interest.
Also in a broad sense every investor lends his money to a borrower
who uses it for a price and is expected to return it one day.
On the other hand, the polarized extremes are conceptually
identifiable: buying shares of a common stock of a publicly-held
corporation, where the impetus for the transaction comes from the
person with the money, is an investment; borrowing money from a
bank to finance the purchase of an automobile, where the impetus
for the transaction comes from the person who needs the money, is
a loan. In between is a gray area which . . . has been and must be
in the future subjected to case-by-case treatment."9

By virtue of these decisions, the exclusion in section 3(a)(10) from
the definition of a security for some short-term notes seems to
have been eroded to insignificance.
A similar trend may also be evident with respect to registration and prospectus requirements and the exemption therefrom
for some short-term notes under section 3(a)(3) of the Securities
Act. Applying the commercial-investment dichotomy to the
transactional context, it has been recognized that a failure to
register investment paper violates section 5.50 Similarly it has
been held that the exemption of short-term notes from registration requirements applies only to commercial notes and not to
investment notes." Furthermore, the exemption in the Securities
Act may have been eroded to the same insignificance as the exclusion in the Exchange Act:
[I]t is the character of the note, not its maturity date, which determines coverage under both the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.52
C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No. 74-1283).
10Hall v. Security Planning Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ariz. 1974); SEC v.
Thunderbird Valley, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 184 (D.S.D. 1973); SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp.
709 (N.D. Tex. 1961); Schamber v. Aaberg, 186 F. Supp. 52 (D. Colo. 1960).
" United States v. Rachal, 473 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927 (1973).
See generally Harrington, Use of the Proceeds of Commercial Paper Issued by Bank
Holding Companies, 29 Bus. LAw. 207, 209-12 (1973).
11SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 525 (5th Cir. 1974). The SEC
is presently reviewing its position with respect to the availability of the section 3(a)(3)
exemption for the sale of commercial paper where the proceeds will be used to finance
equipment leasing. No Action Letter, Connecticut Financial Services Corp. (June 16,
1975).
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To the extent that the securities laws are designed to protect
investors from fraudulent schemes and manipulative investment
devices, the commercial-investment distinction with respect to
notes in the context of the transaction is based upon a reasonable
justification. Furthermore, it would be desirable to harmonize the
applicability of the anti-fraud provisions under the Exchange Act
with those under the Securities Act, particularly as they relate to
notes. If it be conceded that "the definitions of 'security' in the
two Acts are functionally equivalent, 53 and if commercial paper
is not a security by definition under the Exchange Act, commercial notes should similarly not be deemed to be securities by
definition within the registration, prospectus, and anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act. But until that anomaly is finally
resolved either by the courts or by the SEC, a commercial note
may yet be excluded by definition from one act while not being
similarly excluded by definition from the other.
11McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 493 n.1(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 930 (1975).

